

The Exclusive Nature Of Democracy And Social Refabrication Failure In Pakistan: A Tale Of Two Models

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to highlight the integral issues with political model of democracy used in Pakistan. In response of globalization of institutions, Pakistan adopted Majoritarian system of governance on colonial plantation-cum-regional imitation rather than on the base of normative debate or necessity of the society. The incompatibility of the governance model is proving a failure to mainstream the societal divisions which are expanding due to social and economic disparities mainly associated with political power sharing. This paper is based on analysis of Majoritarian model viz-a-viz societal restructuring of Pakistani society to show a mismatch between them; a leading cause of bad governance.

Keywords: Majoritarian, First-Past-The-Post, Proportional Representation, Consociational, Consensual, Ethnic, divided Society

1. Introduction

Pakistan has a heterogeneous society by any means. According to National Census (2017) Pakistan has six ethnic groups. Being a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country it is facing social mobilization due to repressive governance system which lacks in conflict-resolution mechanism. Since inception, despite having a tendency of co-existence within its population, Pakistan is facing governability issues which are indicating flaws within its federal structure. The creation of Pakistan is based on an ideology (Two Nation Theory). This religion-based nationalism was used as a tool to create unity among segments of society to create an independent state. This was not an historical identity. After partition, Pakistan lost its coherence in the face existing ground realities based on societal divisions across sects, ethnicities, linguistics and cultures. After partition,

Pakistan has to face multiple new administrative challenges while old organizational mechanisms also remained intact. The Constitution of 1973 provides a parliamentary set up of federalism that is based on Majoritarian Model inherited from colonial times. The old British system that failed to unite the multinational subcontinent is proving incapable again to negotiate the new ground realities and the societal norms of the new state. Such anachronism resulted in many ethnic, political and linguistic clashes that posed severe problems for Pakistan.

It is quite clear by now that Majoritarian Model is incompatible to resolve divisive issues in Pakistan. The other model of democracy which is more suitable for plural society is Consociationalism. Both models, Majoritarian and Consociationalism, have different features. The Majoritarian Model is non-satisfactorily working to deal with norms of multifaceted society while states are opting for Consensual or Consociationalism to develop some level of national consensus on fundamental issues. After establishing the fact that Majoritarianism is an exclusive model, the research will explore some problems-resolving methods based on the debate of Consociationalism as more conducive model of democracy for heterogeneous societies like Pakistan.

The roots of theoretical reinforcement for this study lies in the western political discourse from which the notion of modern nation-state has been derived (Aristotle, Kant, Rousseau, Tocqueville and many others). This notion was reinforced by many political scientists like Almond and Verba, Dhal, Dimond, MicGarry, O'Leary, Zakria and Horowitz; however, Lijphart is the most relevant to be discussed who proposed the theory of 'Consociationalism' for the settlement of non-territorial issues of a multiethnic and multilingual societies.

At the end of Cold War, the number of deeply divided societies has increased sharply. To manage ethnic diversity, federalism was considered the best mechanism. Now those countries which advocated federalism are representing few basic types of democracy i.e. the Majoritarian, Consensual and Consociational Model. In the case of Pakistani federalism, these models of democracy are discussed here as theoretical framework while concepts of centripetal and centrifugal forces are also relevant to be discussed in this section.

The scenario of democratization in developing countries in the wake of third wave (1974-present) can be analyzed under the implication of the Westminster/Majoritarian Model. This model was formed in Westminster palace on the patterns of the British political system to run the administration of the Commonwealth and ex-Commonwealth countries that were mostly post-colonial, 'Less Developed Countries'. The key characteristics of Majoritarian Model are applied occasionally and supplemented with Consensual Model. The dichotomous difference of the variables of both models work mutually; particular countries may differ to be at either at end of the scale or anywhere stuck in-between (Aithchison 2010). Both models (the Majoritarian and the Consensual) are elaborated under ten variables

The literature review of this paper has been woven around the main themes and invited generous contribution of many renowned writers inside and outside of Pakistan. Tahir Amin (1988), Samad

Yunus (2013), Rounaq Jahan (1972), Muhammad Mushtaq (2011), Shahid Burki (1991), Feroz Ahmed (1998), Muhammad Feyyaz (2011), Aisha Jalal (1995), Iftikhar Malik (1997), Aisha Shahzad (2007), Akbar Zaidi (1992), Lawrence Ziring (1980), Maya Chadda (2000), Stephan Cohen (1987, 2005), Jochen Hippler (2012), Bastian and Luckham (2003), Charles Kennedy (1987, 1993, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2003) and many others are influential contributors while Arend Lijphart's (1969, 75, 77, 85, 96, 2002, 2004) work is the main theoretical plank in this area. Besides Lijphart, Katherine Adeney's stance (2003, 2007) on Pakistan and Indian politics remained helpful in application of the theory.

2. Majoritarian System of Federal Government: A Debate

States around the globe must have to adopt some state structure. In modern polity, this structure is usually based on Majoritarian, Proportional Representation (PR) or mixed voting system which translates votes into seats of Lower and Upper houses of a state. Some scholars have pointed out flaws of Majoritarian Model (for detail see: Lijphart 2008; Bastian and Luckham 2003; Jahan 1972) it is used as a tool to curtail minorities' rights (Lijphart 2007). He suggests reforms in electoral systems under proportional representation and plurality vote system and gives institutional remedies for low turnout in elections. Bastian and Luckham (2003) shed light on the limitation of Majoritarianism, like it is unchecked and has centralizing tendencies. These limitations are structural. In this system, powers are concentrated under the principle of 'winner takes all or First Past the Post' rule.

Moreover, it does not protect minorities' right to have political representation, divide a society and centralize power. This decreases representativeness of democratic government by decreasing participation of marginalized groups. Democracy is incomplete if any of its characteristic is missing, and public participation is the most important component of it. However, this important characteristic is not given proper attention in Majoritarian Model. A representational system is undoubtedly designed to exclude/include people by restricting political choice to vote in elections. The 'hollow citizenship' is created if a state fails to protect the rights of citizens by excluding them from the public sphere like Majoritarianism does (Bastian and Luckham 2003).

Many countries in Asia and Africa are not nations in being but only nations in hope. The starting point of their nationalism placed an "essentially diverse traditional social soil" (Jahan 1972). Though nation-building is a common problem in developing and developed states, a crucial difference is that in developed countries a well-informed ideology, elites and institutions exist and they only need to align their ethnic groups into existing system. But in developing states, there is no pre-existing independent system and they face a twofold problem; first to establish a workable national ideology, elites and institutions and secondly, to integrate their sub-national groups into the newly created national systems (Jahan, 1972). For diverse societies, Lijphart (1977) advocates Consociationalism as the solution to manage ethnic diversity to generate political stability and harmony.

Another school of thought points out the opposite side of the picture. Few scholars have presented examples where Majoritarian Model is successful (see Mc Gann 2002; Waldron 1999; Norris 1995, 2000, 2005). To support Majoritarian Model, Switzerland is a very good example of federalism which has ethnic and lingual diversity i.e., French, German and Italian community groups but the key to success there is that major groups are not coerced for consensus but these groups joined together voluntarily and created a pluralistic nation for overall interests (Healey 2006). In this sense, it is more inclined to consensual model in place of Majoritarian. Switzerland is no longer a confederation but its success is a fruit of transitional process of centuries. Australian federation as Majoritarian is successful because it is a homogeneous society and has no antagonistic and powerful neighbor (Hicks 1978).

Many scholars have pointed out unsuccessful example of Majoritarian model (see Healey 2006; Hicks 1978; Bastian and Luckham 2003). In Ireland, the indigenous Catholics were economically and politically challenged by migrant Protestants from England. This generated a rigid competitive relationship between both communities. In location, Northern Ireland can be compared to ex-East Wing of Pakistan while in ethnic terms; the situation is close to Sindh. Currently, Ireland is demanding more autonomy. Eastern Europe is also ethnically and linguistically plural. Yugoslavia witnessed brutal ethnic clashes between Croats, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. In Rwanda and South Africa colonial powers used the ‘Divide and Rule’ policy and perpetuated myths like “Martial Race” theory. South Africa is though changing now but still inequality and racism exist there. In the past apartheid regime was established in South Africa to reinforce superiority of white people (Healey 2006). Malaysian and Singapore’s federation was short lived (1963-65) (Hicks 1978). Therefore, the liberal democracy is in fashion today because it meets the political aspirations of citizens of developing countries of South and post-communist East who felt themselves excluded and oppressed under authoritarian regimes (Bastian and Luckham 2003).

The above debate depicts that Majoritarianism is successful in case of homogeneous society with better human development indexes and high voting turnout. It gives voice to average citizen and generates quick decision-making but if society is plural with low voting turnout then practicing it would mean wastage of votes with ethnic problem and divisions in society because it is unchecked and generates exclusive governance.

Table: Dichotomous Combination of Majoritarian and Consensual Models (Ten Variables of Majoritarian Model)

S. No.	Majoritarian Model	Consensual Model
1.	Bi-party system	Multi-Party system

2.	Single party dominates cabinet in case of Bi-party system	Coalition cabinets in broad executive power-sharing in case of multipartite system
3.	Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is central	Balance of power between executive and legislature
4.	Majoritarian and disproportional electoral structure (FPTP)	Proportional representation
5.	Pluralist interest-group with free-for-all competition	Corporatist interest group systems intended to conciliation
6.	Unitary and centralized federal system	Decentralization
7.	Unicameral legislature	Bicameralism
8.	Rigid constitutions	Flexible constitutions
9.	Sovereign legislatures	Judicial review via Supreme Court
10.	Central bank dependent on the executive	Independent central bank

Source: Data taken from Lijphart (1999, 3-4) tabulated by author

3. Federalism In Pakistan: Why And How Majoritarianism Is Unsuccessful?

Pakistan is facing governance problems since inception. Ethnic and linguistic divisions of Pakistani society are not given equal representation in its political structure. We are assuming that the federal form of government (like Majoritarian Model) is likely to be incompatible with societal divisions. To test this hypothesis, literature is presented into following categories:

3. 1 Governance System in Pakistan

Pakistan is a federal state based on Majoritarian Model. Its current Constitution of 1973 declares it as an Islamic Republic with a bicameral political system. This incompatible hybridism is one major cause of conflict. Pakistan is a land of many nations having diverse ideas while leaders in Pakistan used thought-suppression policies instead of mainstreaming them.

In this background the role of initial hierarchy is very important. In colonial India, the colonial power was not ready to make subcontinent a modern nation-state. Contrarily, their policy was to maximize power with minimum expenditures. After partition, Pakistani elites instead of building a genuine federalism, emphasized on colonial policies of centralized decision-making and authoritarian rule (Ziring 1980). Initial state and power structures was primarily responsible for warped policy and decision-making (Burki 1991). This power structure comprised on political

elites, the army and bureaucracy comprised of Punjabi, Muhajir and Pakhtuns in upper hierarchy. The religious parties mainly Jama'iat-i-Islami (JI) in the lower rung. In early eleven years (1947-1958) conflict erupted between secular, liberal and religious groups primarily Bengalis, Muhajirs, Punjabis and Pakhtuns, for different incentives. Initially power hierarchy was dominated by the Muhajir-Punjabi alliance which kept other ethnic groups out of power-sharing scheme (Khan 2005). The Bengali demand of greater provincial autonomy was a threat to their rule.

The political history of Pakistan shows the power overlaps between different power contenders. Governance failure is attributed to missed opportunities which are burden of the history (Lodhi 2011) In post-1971 era soon after secession of East Pakistan, PPP government under Bhutto (during 1973-77) raised an ethnic and nationalist rift in Baluchistan and KPs. Political parties became personal fiefdoms. This characteristic is still an obstacle to wider participation and inclusion of ethnic mosaic to integrate them in one nation. National unity was tested by the regional and religious pressures, while breach of constitution by military generals became a routine matter. The real tension is political survival of political parties and minority groups in Pakistan. They sustained their ideality but were suppressed. They could not think about further developments other than their survival (Chadda 2000).

Punjabi domination over smaller provinces was another major issue in governance system of Pakistan. Bengalis were in numerical majority and they demanded a representative government but Punjabi elites resisted their demand. There were Punjabi-Bengali conflicts over constitution-making and Punjabi colonialism raised provincial resentments (Ziring 1980). Political parties entangled themselves in useless personal conflicts over constitution-making and did not force reforms. The secession of East Pakistan was mainly attributed to stubbornness of the winning party i.e. Pakistan People's Party (PPP) from West Pakistan and military elites' resistance to accommodation of Bengali grievances (Lodhi 2011).

In this background, that hegemonic role of Punjab over smaller provinces is visible. Punjab dominated other provinces and there were many anti-Punjabi nationalist parties particularly in Sindh which protested against Sindh's exploitation by Punjab (Singh and Talbot 1996). One Unit scheme was also a political tool to encounter the numerical majority of East-Pakistan and to suppress the nationalist movements and establish Punjabi dominance (Nayak 1984) In the beginning, the Muhajir phenomenon and its quest for power with the help of Civil-Military anarchists against the indigenous Sindhis was unbearable for Punjabi dominant group which see itself on right because of their numerical majority in West Pakistan. Feudal lords also indulged in grabbing their share of power by any means (Lodhi 1999). The center was dominated by Punjabi and Muhajir elites (Chadda 2000). The undue domination of the Punjab province raised anti-Punjabi resentments which still exist among provinces.

The constitutional limbo was at the core issues in post-partitioned Pakistan. The Indian Act of 1935 was adopted initially as an interim constitution and that formed foundation of all constitutions framed after separation of East-Pakistan. This adaptation fostered the movement of provincial

autonomy in West-Pakistan. The vice-regal system of power haunted power structure to be developed horizontally. The center was dominated by an alliance formed by civil-military-bureaucracy and feudal lords who were reluctant to adopt decentralization (Nayak 1984). There were Punjabi-Bengali conflicts over constitution-making (Ziring 1980). Finally, a unanimously accepted constitution was formed in 1973. But this constitution was amended many times by military governments to change its federal nature from parliamentary to presidential one. The constitutional limitations often affected the proper separation of power among executive, legislature and judiciary (Chadda 2000).

Majoritarianism is not a unique dogma and many Muslim states around the world have unitary federation but Pakistan is a multiethnic and multilingual state in its essence (Nayak 1984). Its diversity demanded serious efforts to mainstreaming the society. But initially politicians were incapable of reforming colonial legacies and martial laws never allowed any political activity for growth of political parties' role. This fostered ethnic-linguistic and nationalistic mobilization in every part of the country among alienated groups. For example, General Zia used proportional representation in electoral system just to squeeze the political strength of PPP and constitutional amendments were introduced to convert parliamentary system into a presidential one (Ziring 1980). It is very visible that Pakistani federalism based on Majoritarian Model has a troubled history and long military rule has intensified difficulties to manage diversity as it is a top-down, highly centralized and exclusive model in nature (Samad 2012).

Federalism is successful in those countries where some efforts have been made to recognize the differences. Pakistan was unable to manage differences based on ethnicity, language and culture. Pakistani federalism is a "top-down" model in which the state was created with hope to develop its own social base and development from societal roots. The reason of splitting of Pakistan in 1971 was exclusion of Bengalis from power and exploitation of their natural resources by the central government. In post-1971 scenario, West Pakistan remained heterogeneous as it was ever before. The writer is of the view that in future Pakistan will not face any disaster like split in a big way but its unity will slowly erode until final fracture if the old colonial legacies overshadowed it continuously (Hippler 2012).

Factually, all important segments of Pakistan do not have a proportional representation in key institutions. History of ethnicity since separation of East Pakistan claims that emergence of nationalist movements in other provinces was due to use of brutal methods by central government to suppress them instead of finding means of peaceful reconciliation (Ahmed 1998). Another view is that the successful Bengali movement aggravated ethnic movements in other regions of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh was the reason for which central government dealt hard with regional and ethnic movements in post-1971 era (Feyyaz 2011).

In the nascent state of Pakistan, state-building was focused at the expense of nation-building. The regional and ethnic elites were not ready to settle their scores and even not sincere with their own people and many of them raised slogan of nationalism to divert the attention of their

community fellows from their misdeeds (Amin 1988). The urge of state-building was stronger than nation-building and the elites took these processes simultaneously while both have contradictory mechanism (Jahan 1972). The central government used exclusionist politics to suppress ethnic and linguistic movements which was not suitable for integrity of a state (Khan 2005).

Ethnicity factor is deep-rooted than identity of a separate Muslim nation-state. Therefore, demand of provincial autonomy has remained an integral part of Pakistani politics. The above mentioned governance policies fostered movements based on nationalism like greater Baluchistan, Pakhtunistan, Sindhu Desh and Muhajiristan and now demands for Hazara and Siraiki Provinces are indications of presence of heterogeneous entities (Samad 2013). The political instability led to decision-making system which was not based on a larger and natural constituency (Kazi 1987). The Baluchs, Pakhtuns and Sindhis have been demanding provincial autonomy since inception. Representation of ethnic classes in power structure remained disparate and this inequality continued in other spheres of society.

Inherited weaknesses of the Majoritarian model planted in Pakistan by the ex-colonial power remained an obstacle to develop an effective mechanism for settling of regional claims. Pakistan after partition could not resolve the issues of ethno-linguistic movements because it inherited and continued the pre-partition British policies to control ethnic groups. These policies remained an obstacle in the way of nation-building.

Three main inherited weaknesses were noticed in polity of Pakistan i.e., absence of consensus over the shape of the polity, absence of a procedure for settling regional claims and finally weak organizational structure of the Muslim League in central and provincial governments. There was Pakhtun Movement despite over-representation of Pakhtuns in power hierarchy (civil-military bureaucracy) (Amin 1988). The lack of accommodation of different classes in power-sharing created a deep division in Pakistani society which produced grievances at national level. These provincial, ethnic and class grievances and exclusion led to political mobilization and ethnic problems emerged as an integral part of the civil society. Muslim nationalism was challenged by ethnicity and wrong policies of leaders and weaknesses in inherited governance model from colonial times become a hurdle in good governance (Malik 1997). Commitment to the ideal of democracy based on the Majoritarian model guaranteed a proper division between bureaucracy and a representative political executive.

But in real practice, the bureaucratic authoritarianism inherited in the post-colonial state structure became essential. It proved very difficult to institutionalize the theory of legislative supremacy over the executive. The principle of personal patronage became customary in the function of elected and non-elected institutions. We have noticed the center-province conflicts on some issues; for example, appointment of governor of the provinces by the central government which is a constitutional provision of colonial times and the same provisions are under practice in today's Pakistan. Though, it has given a greater autonomy to provinces but in bureaucratic setup

only (Jetly 2009). This unequal distribution of power is a dominant feature of governance model of Pakistan.

Governance system of Pakistan is an exclusionist model. Bengali nationalism was the ever first sign of exclusion that led to dismemberment of Pakistan. After that, many nationalist movements emerged including political alliances against democratic and elected governments Singh and Talbot 1996). In fact Pakistani government is a systemic domination of one or two nations which is meant for exclusion of other sub-national groups (Jahan 1997). The reason of splitting of Pakistan in 1971 was exclusion of Bengalis from power and exploitation of their natural resources by the central government (Hippler 2012). Regional conflicts in addition to different Islamic brands of politics were a particular feature of Pakistani history (Shafqat, 1997). The emergence of ethno-national movements in Bengal, Baluchistan, KP and Sindh are showing incompatible governance pattern of Pakistani federal model. The exclusion of ethno-lingual groups has created a serious situation of weak governance that leads to lawlessness and disorders. These movements were suppressed for time being by the ruling party and the military dictators (Shahzad 2007). Being a multiethnic state, Pakistan needs to develop a governance system which can represent the whole society adequately through a just and equitable distribution of power. Contrarily, the state used force to suppress these movements with no room for accommodation and compromise (Siddqi 2002) and ethnicity was considered a law and order question instead of governability problem (Malik 1997).

3.1.1 Ethnic and Linguistic Divisions in Pakistan

In establishing the problem of ethnic divisions and governance problems, we have to look back into political history of Pakistan. In Pakistan, the meaning of pluralism is buried in a wrong interpretation of separate electorates that led to societal insecurity. This generated an excludable class concept whose loyalty to the state was called in question (Ahmed 2010). The ethnic and linguistic division of Pakistani society is very visible which is excluded from the governance system of Pakistan.

There are many variables of ethnicity like religion, language, territory, caste etc. which have potential to give birth to violent conflicts in Pakistan. These ethnic groups should be managed to avoid conflicts by giving them proper representation according to constitution (Majeed 2011). Managing ethnic diversity remained problem in Pakistan as witnessed through Baluch uprising (1973-77, 2002-to date), Pakhtun's wish of self-rule (1970s), Sindhi demand of autonomy (1980s) and Muhajir mobilization (1990s). The exclusive nature of power structure and centralized government has marginalized specific ethnic groups. This marginalization pushed alienated groups to mobilize against central government to seek their rights. Power-sharing, decentralization and inclusive politics would generate such type of federation in Pakistan which can facilitate it to lodge all ethnic and linguistic groups together. Political negotiations are important along with distributive justice to ensure power-sharing within the framework of the Constitution of 1973 (Mushtaq 2009).

In Pakistan, many political parties used different interpretations of Islam. It developed such a complex polity based on Islamic ideology that excluded non-Muslims and women in general and certain communities (nationality and sect based) in particular. That generated a sectarian rift within society. The issue of disagreement on distribution of financial resources is tried to be resolved through National Finance Commission (NFC) awards, but no further consensus has been developed on many national interests, and most important is religious harmony.

Pakistani Nation is still busy to purify the ideology and there is a strong disagreement on methods and measures how to do it, which shows lack of national consensus (Ahmed 2010). The ideology of Islam did not prove workable to keep the nation united for a long time and unstable political situation in a divided society (Burki 1991). In Pakistan, Islamization was introduced at the expense of democracy and equal rights. Moudodi's version of Islamic state appeared as an alarming entity against radical threats like PPP. Moreover Yahya's declaration of Islam as the exclusive ideology could not remain Pakistan united. Military always tried to prove itself as the guardian and protector of the ideology of state and used this slogan to legitimize its rule after ousting elected democratic governments many times. Deep divisions in society came with an economic boom and migration of labor force to Gulf States during General Zia's regime that brought back sectarian extremism with it. This Shi'a-Sunni rift gave rise to sect-based ethnic parties (Jetly 2009). The central government failed to unite the nation under perceptive Islamic banner and ethnic appeal became more powerful. There were a number of subordinate aspects of the great exertion of the fake, overarching Pakistani nationalism. The ruling elites remained dominant and demands of minorities were ignored; especially, the demand for an appropriate constitution for Pakistan as a multi-ethnic state.

National language issue haunted Pakistani integrity. Pakistan was the result of a struggle of a variety of people belonging to different backgrounds; As a result the Pakistan that came into existence contained a wide variety of ethnic and linguistic groups and subgroups which had very little in common besides being Muslim. Two official languages (Urdu and English), six or seven important regional languages (Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, Baluchi, Siraiki) and about two dozen of small or local ones (mainly in Northern areas of Pakistan) indicate the linguistic colors of Pakistan (Hippler 2012). According to latest census of Pakistan held in 2017, nine languages are registered while about seventy are estimated (Times of Islamabad 2017; Dawn 2017).

In pre-1971 Pakistan, geographic distance between both parts, heterogeneity in provinces and distribution of the financial resources among them exacerbated tensions. One unit formula created two types of provinces; one (ex-East-Pakistan) linguistically homogeneous (98% Bengali speaking) and second (present Pakistan) was linguistically/ethnically heterogeneous. However, a shift was noted in the Constitution of 1973 towards bicameral system and language policy in which provincial languages were permitted alongside Urdu (Adeney 2012). But practically, the issue still exists despite orders of Supreme Court to make Urdu as official language instead of English.

According to few scholars, Urdu has no roots because it is the language of the inhabitants of central India who migrated to Pakistan after partition (Jetly 2009). The national language was not an issue at start when Jinnah declared 'Urdu' as a national language for the new state of Pakistan. But after Jinnah, the leaders from Bengal made this issue controversial Ahmed 2010).

A society is prone to conflicts where groups face imbalances in strengths. Political system should initiate economic, social and political measures to curb ethnic conflicts. Contrarily, the strategies and policies formulated and implemented by various governments fall short of achieving the objective of nation-building (Majeed 2011). The present ethnic situation demands a governance system incorporated with all ethnic groups. Ethnic problem is more a product of bad governance, economic deprivation of particular areas, and poor representation of certain ethnic groups in national institutions, dominance of few groups and absence of regional/segmental autonomy. Some writers argue that inclusion of other ethnic groups into power structure is against interests of ruling elites (Feyyaz 2011).

3.1.2 Colonial Legacies in Administration and Society of Pakistan

The administrative setup of Pakistan is itself a colonial legacy. Besides divisions in society, the continuation of colonial legacies is another major problem with governance of Pakistan. These legacies have exacerbated societal divisions because Pakistan is a plural state. The British ruled the subcontinent, and after partition Pakistan depended heavily on the colonial state's practice of bureaucratic control and centralization. Mainly, commitment to the ideal of democracy based on the Majoritarian Model of parliamentary government guaranteed a proper division between bureaucracy and a representative political executive. But in real practice, the bureaucratic authoritarianism inherited in the post-colonial state structure became essential. It proved very difficult to institutionalize the theory of legislative supremacy over the executive. The principle of personal patronage became customary in the function of elected and non-elected institutions as well.

We have noticed the center-province conflicts on some issues; for example, appointment of governor for provinces by the central government which is a constitutional provision of colonial times and the same provisions are under practice in today's Pakistan. Though, federal government has given a greater autonomy to provinces but in bureaucratic setup only (Jalal 1995). Same British colonial policies of recruitment patterns were practiced to recruit army officers as the so-called myth of 'Martial Races' continued (Amin 1988). The internal colonialism of governance model brought the dismemberment of state within two decades of birth. Colonial legacies of British rule have contributed to the existing disparities in the political system of Pakistan (Kazi 1987).

3.1.3 Civil-Military Relations

The imbalance in civil-military relations is one of the core reasons to generate political instability in Pakistan. In colonial times, military had a primary role in state affairs. But it is not a democratic institution like parliament, an elected and democratic institution and hence has preference over military. But the British before departure from India left some core issues of permanent conflict

through the demarcation plan of India, i.e. Kashmir (between Pakistan and India) and Durand Line (between Pakistan and Afghanistan).

Therefore, due to security issues, military remained a central contender of power. The rise of military in Pakistan, and the limited and controlled transfer of power to civilian governments have placed severe limitations on functioning of civilian government and the later lost social base of support in public (Kennedy and Rais 1995). The colonial power was not ready to make subcontinent a modern nation-state. Contrarily, their policy was to maximize power with minimum expenditures (Ziring 1980).

The problems of Pakistan are generated by colonial legacies; same are also caused due to political maladministration (Nayak 1984). The civil-military conflicts were mainly due to imbalances of power in the troika of president, prime minister and Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Throughout the political history of Pakistan, the balance between elected and non-elected forces fluctuated and democratic forces remained under severe pressure for survival. The real tension is survival of political parties and minority groups in Pakistan. They remained busy in sustaining their ideality but they were suppressed. They could not think about further developments other than their survival (Chadda 2000).

It is therefore beyond any doubt that a strained civil-military relation is a major impediment of democracy in Pakistan. Hence democracy is practiced only as a lip-service in developing countries like Pakistan where it can be implemented in its true essence.

Majoritarian system is dying gradually because this model is giving different outputs in different countries (Dunleavy 2010). Though it has some common results, somewhere else it is implemented as a hung parliament under short-lived coalition government (in case of multi-ethnic states having multiparty system like Pakistan). Though Majoritarianism is the name of rule of bare majority, however coalition means a government in which no party rules with majority. This is generating an issue of opposition party which uses its blackmailing potential to pressurize the ruling party. Due to these problems, countries are seeking electoral reforms in their political system. Moreover, for multiethnic and multilingual states it did not prove suitable.

In this scenario, Pakistan can be aligned with those countries which are heterogeneous and has a divided society where the implication of the Consociational Model can be endorsed for few years to get consensus. It is a historical fact that Pakistan as a post-colonial entity has inherited its Majoritarian political model from British. However, the major flaw of the model is that it was not implemented in its essence. To get success, it is rightly supplemented with Consensual Model wherever it is used. However, in Pakistan it has practically malfunctioned and proving less satisfactory because it is incompatible with the demography of Pakistan which is multi-ethnic and multi-lingual.

It is an historical fact that different classes with different incentives joined the Pakistan Movement. After partition, they split again in pursuit of their interests. The larger provinces

remained hegemonic that generated alienation in smaller provinces. The smaller provinces grew vocal for their rights and the reason of this ethnic mobilization was the exclusive nature of Majoritarian Model. The present study tends to highlight such issues as mentioned in the research question designed for this study. It aims to cast light on Majoritarian Model and its incompatibilities to settle the governance issues. The other model of democracy which is more suitable for divided society is Consociationalism. Both models, Majoritarian and Consociationalism, have different features and have been discussed in theoretical framework.

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic and linguistic country where hundreds of parties have their social base and bag votes on religious, linguistic and social issues. Election Commission of Pakistan has registered hundreds of political parties (Election Commission of Pakistan). Contrarily, Pakistan practices such an electoral system supports two party system only and include minority votes on expenses of majority wasted votes. Resultantly our parliamentary composition is based on Majoritarian system in which one party dominates in Cabinet. This trend is dangerous in a heterogeneous society fabricated with various ethnic, sectarian and linguistic variants. Due to this trait, executive-legislature relationship is always instable due to domination of executive over legislature in spite of balance of power in between for a smooth mechanism. Moreover electoral system of Pakistan has been already challenged in Supreme Court of Pakistan (Batool 2018). However Pakistan has a bicameral federal design but acts like a unitary state. This showing that Pakistani governance system is more inclined to Majoritarian model which suits to homogenous societies more than a deeply divided society like Pakistan.

4. Federal System of Pakistan in Between of No Where: Discussion

The study of the political history of Pakistan highlights the irony that the officially, the colonial inheritance of Majoritarian model is intact here. But features of Majoritarian model are incompatible because of multifaceted society which is politically diverse too. Geographically, its ethnic and lingual segments are regionally concentrated and lack of conflict resolution mechanism is proving fatal for national integration. It has external threat particularly India which shares a common border with it. To curtail the Indian and other anti-state threats, the strategy of overarching loyalties is needed. However, Muslims are in majority and shares a common religion and a lingua franca (a common language i.e. Urdu) but absence of political power-sharing is a major hurdle and causing a large political and socio-economic disparities in between important segments of society.

The majoritarian model is technically generated for homogeneous or less divided societies as bi-party system is its integral part because of electoral engineering through First-Past-The-Post or Alternative vote. It generates better results for homogenous societies but proves exclusionist for deeply divided societies like Pakistan. The reason of this incompatibility lies in the diversity of the Pakistani society which is deeply divided. Moreover, it has multi-party system whereas Majoritarian model supports two-party system in connection of FPTP electoral system as Pakistan is practicing. Corruption is uncontrollable due to one party rule or weak coalition of parties due to

malpractice under incompatible electoral system. Contrarily, a few practices are taken from Consensual Model i.e. Bicameralism, and judicial review via Supreme Court but these features could not help to control the issues of nation-building and integration to build a national consensus on fundamental issues.

The need of hour is a paradigm shift to a more inclusive, flexible, decentralized and compatible governance model. Pakistan is lurking in between both models but more inclination is towards Majoritarian model which this study proves an incompatible one for societies like Pakistan. The Majoritarian model is dying world widely.

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